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Reliability, Recovery, and Reuse 
The Three R's of a National Launch Strategy
Ed Bangsund*/Vince Caluori**
* Director of Space Product Area Marketing, Boeing Defense & Space Group
** Launch Vehicle Program Manager, Boeing Defense & Space Group
Background
The United States is approaching the 21st century with it's space launch 
community providing only 1960 technology systems with unimpressive 
success records and with serious deficiencies in operational responsiveness 
and commercial viability. The current expendable systems have 
demonstrated launch success ratios of 0.85 to 0.95 with launch costs two to 
five times higher than the world class competition. The present U.S. Space 
Launch Infrastructure cannot support achievement of our National Space 
goals for Defense, Space Communication, SSF Logistics, and Exploration. 
Over the past 10 years, we have witnessed our share of the commercial 
satellites launched dwindle from 100% to less than 25%. We recovered 
from a series of major launch failures in the mid '80's but have been 
plagued again in '91 and '92 with major launch system failures.
This environment creates a spiral that keeps our launch systems in a state 
of "limbo" or no change (see figure 1). Since it is so expensive to operate 
our current fleet of launch systems, it rolls up to very high cost space 
programs. This prevents us from starting new programs, resulting in less 
payloads, which feed the rationale to keep our existing fleet. This death 
spiral must be broken in order for the U.S. to regain its lead in the world 
launch vehicle market.
These non-complementary efforts by DoD and NASA were further confused 
by the national Aerospace Plane (NASP) and SDIOs Single Stage to Orbit 
programs causing Congress to cancel the NLS program in their 1993 
deliberations. They have asked that agencies return this spring with an 
affordable National Strategy which accommodates real and documented 
needs.
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Future Choices
The nation has several options to pursue all with significant consequences (see figure 2). They are; (1) Do Nothing - This temptation to do nothing is strong, however the long term DoD/NASA cost penalty is large and we will find ourselves out of the commercial space launch business in the next decade; (2) Upgrade the current systems - The current family (Shuttle, Titan, Atlas, Delta, etc.) can be upgraded/enhanced but will still carry the high cost and poor operational features of the 1960/1970 technology. The end result is that we can spend a significant amount of money in upgrading these systems and still end up being non-competitive in comparison to newly developed foreign systems in the next decade; (3) Develop Separate NASA and Air Force Vehicles - Proceed with separate developments by NASA and the Air Force - NASA to focus on a heavy lift vehicle or Shuttle replacement for eventual manned exploration and the Air Force to focus on a single vehicle to replace the Titan/Atlas/Delta. Share common development articles where efficient (e.g., engines, upper stages, avionics). The NLS program was moving in this direction just prior to Congressional cancellation; (4) Leap-frog to a fully recoverable Space Plane - One need only watch a normal launch of a large existing booster and the associated "loss" of expensive expendable hardware to envision the possible benefits of a fully recoverable SSTO, NASP, HSCT, etc. The temptation is to jump ahead to achieve the very low cost per flight numbers that proponents of these systems project. In reality, technology is not available in the near term, the up front development costs are very high (3 to 4 times the costs of more conventional booster systems) and the low cost per flight numbers are feasible only with very high traffic rates - well in excess of the current projections for the 2000 to 2020 time period; (5) Build a 20-50K NLSISpacelifter - Develop a highly reliable system that will be an economic break-thru for the space launch business in the same way that the 707 paved the way for the air transport business. Provide the dependability, responsiveness, and commercially attractive features to dominate the space launch business in the next century. Build the system initially as an unmanned launch vehicle replacement for Titan/Atlas and use these initial missions to verify the system as a manned launch vehicle. Develop a parallel PLS/upper stand and CRTV to enable the phaseout of the Shuttle.
2-54
Proposed Solution r; ^ ^!f .1 :
Boeing has participated in numerous government contract studies and 
independently examined many launch system alternatives over the last 
eight years. There are two hard conclusions that have repeatedly been 
reached in all these studies as well as reinforced by our experience with 
commercial airplanes: (1) A new launch system must offer a major 
improvement in launch reliability. The true cost of failure measured in 
monetary and non-monetary and non-monetary terms make 99+% 
reliability a key and obtainable goal of a new launch system (see figures 3 
& 4); (2) Launch costs must be drastically reduced while maintaining a n 
affordable development cost. The single most significant means to reduce 
the cost per launch is to recover and reuse high value hardware elements 
("See figure 5). The most effective means of minimizing development cost 
is to develop a single "core vehicle" with modular elements that can be 
integrated to form launch vehicles of varying payload capacities (see 
figure 6). By developing a system that meets these two "goals", we also 
achieve the desired improvements in dependability, operational features, 
responsiveness, commercial development risk reduction. For example:
• High reliability and low cost per launch bring commercial viability 
and world class competitiveness along with a major reduction in total 
cost of launch (i.e., reduced cost of failure).
• Recovery/reuse of high value elements makes the technology of 
automated vehicle health monitoring affordable, which enables 
improvements in operability, dependability, and responsiveness.
• Recover/reuse of the engine the cost per flight and also makes the 
total system less sensitive to the per unit cost risk of the engine since 
an increase in engine cost of 50 or even 100% is reduced by a factor 
of 8-10 reuse.
The system solution is summarized in figure 7.
The following are additional features and benefits of our recommended 
solution:
• Recover/reuse of high value hardware can reduce the cost per launch 
by 47% compared to expendable launch systems. The 2% non­ 
recurring cost penalty is paid back within two flights. This results in 
a projected life cycle cost savings of multi-billion dollars compared to 
a conventional expendable launch vehicle system.
2-55
• High reliability requires adoption of an "engine out" operating 
philosophy. Just as with modern transport aircraft that are designed 
to "fail safe" with one engine out, so must the modern space launch 
system be able to successfully complete its mission with one engine 
failed. This is mandatory for a multi-engine launch vehicle to 
achieve high reliability levels.
• No new engine development is necessary although the STME could be 
phased-in in the future for additional cost reduction. Use of the 
SSME LO2/LH2 engines provides high performance without 
environmental issue.
• Modular redundant systems are cost effective when systems are 
recovered and reused and thus the "minimum equipment list" 
philosophy used in the aircraft industry is also viable for the space 
launch business. This enables highly dependable/high responsive 
launch operations. Space launch operations finally become "routine 
and uneventful" just as our airline operations have become.
• The proposed system solution meets the program goals using today's 
demonstrated technologies. No advanced technology risk is 
necessary.
Supporting Rationale
The requirements and the mission model have been validated. The 
government and industry have spent $500M and 6 years of effort by our 
top engineering teams to identify system architectural options and resolve 
the technical issues. The technical base is firm.
• Feasibility of recovery has been demonstrated in a technology risk 
mitigation program which was structured to address each issue in 
question. The last page of this presentation is a summary of the 10- 
minute video of the Advanced Development Program (ADP) which 
validated the Propulsion Module Recovery/Reuse Concept.
  Conservative cost analysis based upon Shuttle derived actual costs 
for recovery/refurbishment operations.
• Recovery concept based upon proven Apollo approach. No advanced 
technology issues involved.
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Motivation for Recovery
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Proposed National Spacelift Program
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Conclusion
The Government team must show that the program can be accomplished 
without major increase in the NASA/DoD budget. The savings by 
transitioning from the Titan, Atlas and Shuttle systems will off-set the 
development cost of the system. The potential for contractor cost sharing 
by establishing incentives to invest such as investment tax credits, or the 
allowance of interest costs should be examined to encourage commercial 
participation.
The Government must show that the development of the partially reusable 
system is the natural evolution toward the fully reusable advanced 
generation solution. As the traffic expands and the technology matures, 
the "space plane" becomes the evolutionary result.
The partially recoverable, modular system offers the technical 
and operational innovations, dramatic cost reductions and high 
reliability that will be enthusiastically supported by Congress 
and the general public. The studies have been done. The 
system is ready to go into DEM/VAL.
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Propulsion Module Recovery ADP Results
Reentry Aero/Aerothermal Tests: 57 hypersonic wind tunnel aerothermal test runs were made in which paint melt, oil flow 
and shadowgraph data were gathered. Heating data were used to define requirements for an ablative thermal protection 
system. 204 hypersonic and transonic aerodynamic wind tunnel runs were made in which force and moment, Schlieren and oil 
flow data were gathered. Tests proved the module to be aerodynamically stable and controllable.
Water Landing & Seakeepinq Tests : Water landing was initially studied 
with a computer simulation model which incorporated hydrodynamic 
impact theory. A subscale test program was subsequently conducted in a 
tank basin which included 60 drop tests with a full range of landing 
velocities and attitudes. Drops were made on both waves and calm 
water. Relatively low immersion depths and water spray loads confirmed 
that a deployable, lightweight, engine spray shield was feasible. 
Seakeeping tests in severe seas showed the module to be a stable, 
seaworthy configuration. Landing stability is enhanced and impact loads 
are minimized by using a proper parachute hang angle. Load and shock 
environment levels are less critical than other typical flight environments 
for launch vehicle equipment. Tipover rates were estimated at less than 
2% for the wave and wind conditions in the recovery area.
Ocean Recovery Operations Tests : Validation of an ocean recovery 
approach was accomplished by a progression of concept studies, design, 
subscale model basin tests and open ocean recovery operations. System 
criteria were used to evaluate numerous concepts. The primary concept 
chosen for development was a buoyant ramp. The buoyant ramp is 
designed to provide compensation of wave induced motions between the 
propulsion module and the ship, thus, allowing an easy retrival of the 
module up the ramp and onto the ship. Recovery of the module with the 
ramp requires only onboard ship operations with a small crew. Subscale 
model basin recovery testing was performed and consistied of 200 
individual tests with a full range of simulated wave and wind environments.
Recovery development culminated with 1/2 scale open ocean tests. 
Testing at 1/2 scale provided a realistic simulation of full scale recovery 
operations including crew and shipboard equipment interfaces. A 140 foot 
recovery ship was used with a 1/2 scale module. A series of towing, 
messenger line snare and recovery tests were performed. The final stage 
of the 1/2 scale recovery tests consisted of rough water recoveries with a 
buoyant ramp design based on model basin test results. Over 20 routine 
recoveries were performed in rough seas with waves to 12 feet high.
Test results provide high stabilty and low impact loads 
with use of parachute harness hang angle
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This page summarizes a 10 minute video which will accompany the presentation
